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17 January 1985

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible KGB Involvement in Murder of Polish Priest

The above Current Intelligence Memorandum, SOVA M-10013CX, dated 10 January 1985, was issued with an incorrect number.

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	Central Intelligence Agency		20,
	Washington, D. C. 20505	10 January 1985	
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMOR	RANDUM		
SUBJECT: Possible KGB Inv	volvement in Mu	rder of Polish Priest	
Whatever the outcome Warsaw, definitive evidence the Soviets in the mid-Oct priest Father Jerzy Popiel Internal Affairs Ministry memorandum examines possib Soviets could have seen in Whether or not the KGB was Father Popieluszko, the So responsibility. By encour party and police to push a Solidarity, they helped cr could occur.	ce clearly impl tober murder of luszko by offic may never surf ble disadvantag n arranging or s actively invo oviets bear som raging hardline for harsher mea	human rights activist ials of the Polish ace. This speculative es and advantages the allowing the murder. lved in the murder of e indirect factions in the Polish sures against	25X1
Case Against Soviet Involv	vement		
Several arguments car of Soviet complicity in the		gainst the hypothesis	
It is not at all cl alternative to Jaru not wish to take <u>a</u> r	uzelski. If the	ey do not, they would	
ability to rule.		<b>—</b>	25X <sup>-</sup>

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments or questions may be addressed to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division

SOVA M 85-10013CX

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
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Even if the Soviets wanted to remove Jaruzelski or to increase pressure on him to hew more closely to Moscow's wishes, they could not be confident that they could control developments in Poland following the murder. They might have feared that the murder would backfire, leading to an undesirable level of popular turmoil or to a strengthening of Jaruzelski's position. For example, the Soviets might have anticipated Jaruzelski would use the murder as a pretext for a lower-level housecleaning of the pro-Soviet faction of the Interior Ministry. He now appears to be trying to single out Soviet-backed	
Politburo member Miroslaw Milewski for negligence, setting the stage for his removal.  The timing of the murder argues against KGB participation. At a time when the Italian Government is trying a Bulgarian for the attempt on the life of the Pope amid suspicions of KGB complicity, the Soviets might well hesitate to undertake an operation that could draw attention to a possible KGB role in a political	25 <b>X</b> 1
assassination.  It is not necessary to posit KGB involvement to account for the priest's murder. Sentiment for harsher measures against Solidarity exists within some circles of the polish party and security forces. A Polish faction could have acted independently to kill the priest in order to scare Solidarity, to cause unrest that would force the government to crack down harder, or to create a complete impasse between the regime and Solidarity elements and thereby undermine Jaruzelski's position and strengthen the hand of hardliners.	25X1 25X1
On the other hand, several reasons can be adduced that could have impelled the Soviets to seek the priest's death:  The Soviets have faulted Jaruzelski for not moving effectively to rebuild the Polish party and for being too accommodating to opposition elements (e.g., Solidarity, the church). They could have believed the murder would be instrumental in reminding Jaruzelski of their ability to create problems for him, in creating an environment that would make his objective of establishing a modus vivendi with the church impossible to achieve, or even in weakening the Polish elite's confidence in his ability to control events and thereby	
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- Liter the store for a move against him.	
setting the stage for a move against him.	
for example, before his abduction and murder, <u>Izvestiya</u> had attacked Popieluszko by name as a counterrevolutionary. Since his murder, Soviet media have reiterated the need for the Poles to get tough with	1
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## Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

16 November 1984

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attached is a speculative memorandum assessing the possibility of KGB involvement in the murder of the Polish priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko. I have made no further dissemination of this but we plan to send a copy to Matlock, Armacost and Palmer.

Richard J. Kerr Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

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